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Albert W. Alschulert
The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime Control' by Norval
Morris and Gordon Hawkins was published in 1970; Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice2 by Charles E. Silberman appeared in 1978.
The two books are in many ways similar, offering their readers nontechnical, highly readable tours of crime and criminal justice. Both
books examine such topics as the fear of crime, the unreliability of
3
crime statistics, and demographic explanations of crime patterns;
both also explore reform of police, sentencing and parole, juvenile
justice, and corrections.' Both studies, moreover, distill the finest
thinking of their times on the issues that they address, capturing in
a single volume what criminal justice scholars would view mostly as
"the conventional wisdom" and what some of them might indeed
disparage as "little that is really new."' 5 But the eight years that
t Professor of Law, University of Colorado. The author wishes to express his gratitude
to Marianne Wesson for her suggestion that a review of Silberman's book might profitably
contrast it with a book by Norval Morris and Gordon Hawkins published a number of years
ago.
I N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST PoLITIcIAN's GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL (1970)
[hereinafter cited without cross-reference as MORRIS & HAWKINS].
' C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JusTicE (1978) [hereinafter cited without
cross-reference as SILBERMAN].

Silberman's portrait of crime in America is, however, far more frightening than that of
Morris and Hawkins. At the time that Morris and Hawkins wrote, it was possible to take
seriously the idea that apparent increases in crime rates could be attributed primarily to the
better reporting of crime; and although Morris and Hawkins ultimately rejected this view,
they did seem to believe that increased crime rates could be attributed largely to better
reporting coupled with simple demographic changes such as increased urbanization and the
increased proportion of young people in American society. Silberman's description of the
changing quantity and the changing quality of crime dispells this illusion and forces sharper
recognition of the seriousness of "the crime problem."
The topical overlap is not, however, complete. Except for some observations about
sentencing, Morris and Hawkins did not consider the work of the criminal courts, and they
did not confront the relationship between race and crime. Although Silberman addresses
these topics, he does not, to any significant extent, consider the problems of organized crime,
victimless crime, and the role of the psychiatrist in the administration of criminal justice,
all of which were treated by Morris and Hawkins.
It should be noted in addition that Silberman's book is longer and much more thoroughly
documented than the work by Morris and Hawkins, which was intended only to provide a
brief overview of some significant criminal justice issues.
Parts of each study do, however, make valuable original contributions. This is certainly
true of the most noted and the most worthwhile chapter of Silberman's book, "'Beware the
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elapsed between the books have made a difference, and the difference in retrospect seems dramatic.
I. A

REASSESSMENT OF

The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime
Control

Upon its appearance, the Morris-Hawkins volume was properly
hailed as "one of the most fascinating and useful books written on
the subject of crime control,"' 6 as "an intelligent, effective and humane prescription of precisely what we must do,"' and as "a unique
contribution.

. .

up-to-date, broad in view, and certainly objective,

even in the areas where one might disagree with it."" Even after
nearly a decade, moreover, most of the book remains fresh, insightful and worthwhile. Occasionally, however, a reader comes upon
passages that seem somewhat quaint. In some measure, the provocative salt-and-pepper style of Professors Morris and Hawkins may
contribute to this current perception: which other scholars before or
since have labeled their fifty-two prescriptions for reform "ukases"?
In the main, however, it is the buoyant ideas, not the flamboyant
style, that seem out of place in 1979.
Morris and Hawkins began their book by saying, "We offer a
cure for crime," 9 and a large portion of their proposals were unblushingly justified, in the book's title and thereafter, as "crime control"
measures. The honest politician was directed initially to confront
"overcriminalization" or "victimless crime," a phenomenon that
most law school academics probably would have listed as the principal defect of the criminal justice system in the late 1960s. On the
subject of public drunkenness, Morris and Hawkins announced:
"For the police and paddy wagons we would substitute minibuses,
each with a woman driver and two men knowledgeable of the local
community in which the minibus will move." 0 They also reported
Day They Change Their Minds': Race, Culture, and Crime." It is also true of many of the
observations in the Morris and Hawkins chapter on "Crime and the Psychiatrist" and of
their brilliant deflation of a massive body of scatterbrained literature in "Organized Crime
and God."
I Barrett, Book Review, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 617 (1971).
7 Morris, Book Review, 45 WASH. L. REV. 851, 870 (1970).
8 Breitel, Book Review, 37 U. CHi. L. REv. 628, 634 (1970).
MoRRis & HAWKINS at ix.
,Id. at 7. The authors explained that "[a] woman is preferred to a man as the driverradio-operator because it is our experience that the presence of a woman has an ameliorative
effect on the behavior of males, even drunken males." Id. Presumably the reason the other
occupants of the minibus should be males was too obvious for mention, although Morris and
Hawkins did say: "If there be a protest or resistance by a drunk, cowardice and withdrawal
must control our team's actions . . . ." Id. at 7-8.
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that "the British approach to [the problem of narcotics addiction]
. . .has resulted in a situation where no serious drug problem exists"" and that "[t]he principal lesson to be learned from Nevada
is that gambling can be kept clean and does not have to be run by
criminals.""
On police reform, although Morris and Hawkins favored the
review of police conduct by ombudsmen and civilian review boards,
their primary hope seemed to lie in the development of a different
breed of cop: "We, too, have a dream. It is that the social conscience
of the current generation of young people which has led them to
Peace Corps and protest will learn to express itself in police service.""3 Morris and Hawkins proposed that officers be encouraged to
study their social-service function in college-level courses-a proposal that has since been largely implemented through LEAA
grants, with the result that the newest "department of mickeymouse" at numerous institutions of higher learning has become that
of criminal justice studies. 4 Morris and Hawkins also proposed to
replace current police uniforms with "dark blazer[s] edged and
pocketed in a sharply contrasted color,"' 5 and they suggested a program to remedy what they viewed as a lack of progress "in introducing technology into the police world.""'
The two authors plainly did not anticipate the neoretributionism of today, 7 a fact that emerged in their discussion of
a variety of topics. Although they recognized that "[h]istorically
the defense of insanity made good sense," 18they proclaimed that the
time had come for its abolition. This defense would be an anachronism in "a future in which moral outrage and name-calling will not
so significantly influence our reaction to the behavior of others."'
Morris and Hawkins assured us, too, that "the prison or penitentiary as we know it will almost certainly have followed the death
penalty, banishment, and transportation into desuetude before the
" Id. at 9.
22

Id.

at 12.

Id. at 87.
" This comment is admittedly based on very limited knowledge. Although I have encountered many police officers who were working toward undergraduate and advanced degrees on "the company's dime," I have yet to meet one who regarded his college-level studies
as very helpful in his work.
" Moius & HAwIUNs at 106.
" Id. at 101.
'7 For an expression of the modern neo-retributive viewpoint, see White, Making Sense
of the CriminalLaw, 50 U. COLO. L. Rv.1, 16-27 (1978).
"Momis & HAWKrNs at 178.
Id. at 184.
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end of the century."20 Because "institutional confinement in some
form [would] remain necessary for some offenders,

' 21

however,

Morris and Hawkins described how a model institution to treat22"the
hardest and most troublesome cases" might be structured.

"It

must be stressed," they said, "that ultimate responsibility [for the
administration of this institution] resides in the medical director,
since everything that occurs in the institution is 'treatment.'
There is no problem of custody,'23of discipline, or of maintenance that
is not also a treatment issue.

On capital punishment, the authors declared: "The conclusion
which emerges

.

.

from all the literature and research reports on

the death penalty is, to the point of monotony: the existence or
nonexistence of capital punishment is irrelevant to the murder, or
attempted murder, rate. This is as well established as any other
proposition in social science.

' 24

And later: "[W]hen one looks at

the pattern of capital punishment for murder in the world, it becomes clear that this is a rapidly declining sanction. We2' 5can reasonably exclude it from our consideration of the future.

Of course, even in 1970, faith in society's ability to achieve the
redemption of criminals had dimmed. Morris and Hawkins quoted
Leslie Wilkins: "'The major achievement of research in the field of
social pathology and treatment has been negative, resulting in the
undermining of nearly all the current mythology regarding the effectiveness of treatment in any form.' ,,26 Still, Morris and Hawkins,
like the participants in another long and discouraging battle of the
late 1960s, saw light at the end of the tunnel. They encouraged
correctional authorities to "develop community treatment programs
for offenders, providing special intensive treatment as an alternative to institutionalization. 21 7 Even within institutions, moreover,
2

Id. at 124.

21 Id.
22 Id. at 197-200.
2

Id. at 198.

24

Id. at 75-76.

21

Id. at 183.

Id. at 120 (quoting Wilkins, A Survey of the Field frorn the Standpoint of Facts
and Figures, in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUNISHMENT AND OTHER MEASURES OF TREATMENT 90
app. (Council of Europe 1967)).
SMoRRS & HAwKINs at 112. At four separate points in a short book, Morris and Hawkins offered their special praise for the California Youth Authority Community Treatment
Project. Id. at 121, 144, 169, 249. An "unusually rigorous . . . evaluative design" had revealed that probation revocation was only about half as frequent for a group of juvenile
delinquents who had been "returned to the community [to] receive. . . such treatments as
intensive individual counseling, group counseling, group therapy, family counseling, school
tutoring services, and involvement in various other group activities" than for a control group
26
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they reported that successful treatment was possible:
Through group counseling, group therapy, guided group interaction, unstructured group discussions-whatever the nomenclature-groups of prisoners in many correctional systems are
being brought together in relatively free verbal association to
discuss their adjustment to society. . . .It is being found that
from such peer clashes, from the interaction between the group
and the individual, some prisoners are being led to sufficient
insight and motivation to avoid crime in the future.',
With a decade's hindsight, the discussion of sentencing and
parole in the Morris-Hawkins volume seems especially passe. Although Norval Morris has since favored the abolition of parole, at
least in "the long run, 29 and although he has endorsed the creation
of a commission to channel the sentencing discretion of federal
judges,3" in 1970 he and his coauthor favored the sentencing provisions of the Model Penal Code, provisions designed to insure that
judges would have substantial sentencing discretion and that the
minimum and maximum terms of incarceration would be kept far
apart:
[W]ithin the limits set by prescribed maximum and minimum the correctional administration should be free to decide
how long the prisoners ought to be held. . . .The correctional
"assigned to California's regular institutional treatment program." Id. at 121-22. Nevertheless, this empirical conclusion soon followed the path of most other optimistic findings in the
area of corrections-it was one more of the practical jokes that God plays on those who
undertake His work. As James Q. Wilson, noting research that appeared shortly after the
Morris-Hawkins study, explained:
[T]he experimental group not only did not commit fewer offenses, they committed
more. Probation officers assigned to the experimental group were not revoking probation
when young people in that group committed new offenses, while probation officers assigned to the regular youth (the "control group") were revoking probation in the normal
way whenever a new offense was committed. In short, the "treatment" program did not
alter the behavior of the delinquents, it only altered the behavior of the probation
officers.
J. WSON, THINKING ABouT CRIME 168 (1975).
2s MoRIus & HAwKINs at 133.
11 Morris, Conceptual Overview and Commentary on the Movement Toward
Determinacy, in DETERMINATE SENTENCING: REFORM OR REGRESSION? 1, 8 (Report of the Proceedings of the Special Conference on Determinate Sentencing 1978).
' See Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearing on S.1437 and S.31, S.45, S.181,
S.204, S.260, S.888, S.979 and S. 1221 Before the Subcomm. on CriminalLaws and Procedures
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9268 (1977) (letter from Norval
Morris to Sen. Edward M. Kennedy).

1012

The University of Chicago Law Review

[46:1007

administration is in the best position to judge when the release
of the prisoner will be safe, and here it can take advantage of
any improved methods developed by the behavioral sciences
3
for predicting behavior and identifying dangerous offenders. '
A view of sentencing that would have the trial judge act
"merely as a channel through which the law expresses its predetermined and impartial decision" seemed hopelessly outdated in 1970:
For such a purpose the classic figure of Justitia was an apt
symbol, with her covered eyes, her scales to weigh the moral
and social gravity of the crime, and her sword swift to execute
the customary capital punishment. Time has not dealt kindly
with her ....
For the particular task of sentencing convicted criminals
Justitia would be well advised to change her equipment. From
her left hand she should drop the scales and put in its place
the case history, the symbol of the full psychological, sociological, and criminological investigation of the individual criminal.
Her right hand will find very little use for a sword in the modern penal system; she needs to have at the fingertips of that
hand a grasp of the increasing range of penal techniques.
Around her knees she would be well advised to gather the adolescent social sciences, who though they have not her tradition
or established place in the community are vigorous and rapidly
growing children of some ability. Finally, it is essential that she
remove that anachronistic bandage from her eyes and look
about at the developments in society generally and the demands on her for the imposition of rational sentences on those
aberrant members of the community who break the rules of the
32
criminal law.
This metaphor was expressed in a striking cover that the University of Chicago Press provided for the Morris-Hawkins book. It
depicted Justitia grasping her scales, but lifting the bandage from
one eye and boldly peering forth. This imagery seemed appropriate,
not only for Morris's and Hawkins's discussion of sentencing, but for
their final recommendation, a large-scale research program. Although they recognized that extensive research into the causes of
crime had proven unproductive, they had greater hope for other
forms of social science investigation:
31 MORRIS & HAWKINS at 141. Compareid. with N. MoRIus, THE FuTuRu
OF IMPRISONMENT
47-50 (1974) (defense of parole in terms of its "latent" functions rather than in terms of the
more traditional functions emphasized by Morris and Hawkins in 1970).
32 Id. at 138-39.
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In every appropriation for any agency or institution connected
with the criminal justice system at least 5 percent of the total
shall be allocated for research purposes.
All new crime prevention or correctional methods and practices
shall be subject to critical evaluation.
The federal government shall establish a National Foundation
for Criminal Research charged with the responsibility of stimulating and coordinating research, development, test, and evaluation projects in the field of crime and its control. Primary
components of the research program shall be: (a) systems analysis studies; (b) field experimentation in police and correctional areas; (c) prediction research; (d) evaluative research in
both police and correctional areas; (e) deterrence research; and
3
(f) equipment system research and development.
This proposal, too, has been largely implemented at the federal
level, and the principal result of the outpouring of social science
research during the past decade has been the widespread disillusionment that today makes much of the Morris-Hawkins study
seem dated.
II.

THE LESS BRAVE NEW WORLD OF CHARLES E. SILBERMAN

Morris and Hawkins-as wise, respected and knowledgeable a
pair as have labored in the field of criminal justice-spoke for almost all of us a short decade ago. One wonders, therefore, to what
extent the current wisdom encapsulated by Charles E. Silberman
will seem out of date ten years from now. Although it is safe to predict that today's dominant viewpoints will not remain in fashion
indefinitely, my guess is that the Silberman volume will exhibit at
least somewhat greater staying power than the Morris-Hawkins
tract. I hasten to add that this prediction does not necessarily
reflect Silberman's unusual perspicacity. Rather, we may have
hunkered down so low as to leave very little for the scholars of 1989
to shoot at.
Silberman gives us no "ukases" and no "cure for crime":
[I]f the past teaches us anything, it is that there are no quick
and easy solutions to the enduring problem of criminal violence-not through social reform, and not through "law and
order." On the contrary, the search for panaceas has often
3

Id. at 239.
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made matters worse. For one thing, the institutions of the criminal justice system are inordinately complex . . . . Hence attempts to change the police, courts, and prisons often backfire.
In trying to increase the effectiveness of our law enforcement machinery . . . we would do well to keep in mind the
ancient and fundamental principle of medical practice:
Primum non nocere-"First,do no harm." For the most part,
the history of national and local "wars on crime" is a record of
impotence and failure-of unintended consequences being
larger than, and often in the opposite direction from, those that
were intended."
This restatement of the political philosophy of Edmund Burke 35
provides the central theme of Criminal Violence, CriminalJustice,
but it constantly does battle with Silberman's latent liberalism. In
this respect Silberman's book reflects not simply the current state
of criminal justice scholarship, but America's post-Watergate,
double-digit-inflation, energy-crisis blues. Emotionally repelled by
the nay-sayers who view most problems as intractable, and intellectually unpersuaded by the yea-sayers who believe that many
of them might be solved, Silberman attempts to preserve both
hope and realism in an era in which these concepts seem to be in
tension-greater tension even than in the not-so-distant and farfrom-halcyon days of The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime
Control.
The resulting accomodation lies mainly in the manipulation of
symbols. The appearance of justice is important, Silberman assures
us repeatedly, even if we cannot hope to change the substance. Of
course we need reform-things like guidelines to make the actual
explicit. And greater human kindness at any stage of the criminal
justice system would surely have value even if it led to nothing
more. Besides, even when reforms amount merely to symbolism,
they have their uses; man does not live by bread alone. In general,
it seems to me, Silberman's advocacy of "moderate" reform has a
hollow and rather desperate quality.
at 173.
Burke, for example, in language very much like Silberman's, described "the ceasing
to do ill" as "the surest of all reforms, perhaps the only sure reform." He urged the people
"to tolerate a condition which none of their efforts can render much more than tolerable."
And he described "a blind and furious spirit of innovation" as "the greatest of all evils." E.
BURKE, A Letter to William Elliot, Esq., in 5 WoRKS OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE EDMUND BURKE
123-24 (rev. ed. Boston 1866). For a discussion of Burke's influence on the "new conservative"
movement exemplified by such writers as Irving Kristol and Nathan Glazer, see I. KRAMNICK,
THE RAGE OF EDMUND BURKE 48-51 (1977).
3' SILBERMAN
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The Cult of Complexity

It is the Burkean side of Silberman that academic readers, at
least, will probably find most convincing. Where Morris and Hawkins described British-style heroin maintenance as "the one certain
way totally to abolish" the serious crime committed by addicts,3
Silberman concludes that the American methadone maintenance
programs of subsequent years probably have had the opposite effect.
The studies that purport to show a reduction in crime by participants in these programs are methodologically defective. "More carefully controlled studies" yield very different results:
Among addicts thirty years of age or younger . . . arrests for
robbery, burglary, and other street crimes actually increased.
By freeing young addicts of the need to spend most of their
time "chasing the bag," methadone apparently gave them
more time and energy to commit predatory crimes. In April,
1974, the Drug Enforcement Agency's statistical division reported that compared with heroin addicts, "methadone addicts
are equally prone to arrest, are more prone to commit property
crimes or crimes of assault, and they are equally unemployed."
• . . Other studies have shown a decline in criminal activity
while addicts are enrolled in a methadone program, but an
increase after they leave itY
In their discussion of the police function, Morris and Hawkins
urged that the "technology explosion" be brought to bear on law
enforcement. They reported, for example, that "[s]tudies by the
President's Crime Commission demonstrated the importance of reducing police response time as a means of increasing the ability of
the police to detect and apprehend criminals. 3 8 Unlearned observers might be surprised that "studies" were necessary to demonstrate
this proposition, but it seems that not only were the studies necessary, they were wrong. Silberman debunks the myth:
New technology does not help, either. Since the mid-1960s,
police departments have invested huge sums in computerized
telecommunication systems designed to cut the period that
elapses between the time a citizen calls the police to report a
crime and the time a patrol car arrives at the scene. But cutting
a police department's response time does little good when, as
Momis & HAWKINS at 9.
3

Sn.!EmA at 181 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
at 103.

Is Momis & HAWKINS
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researchers recently discovered, crime victims wait twenty to
sixty minutes before they call the police. By keeping police
officers locked up inside their patrol cars, the emphasis on
mobility and rapid response time has reduced person-to-person
contact between the police and the people being policed,
thereby hampering policemen's ability to prevent or solve
crimes. 39
Indeed, one wonders upon reading Silberman whether the police make any difference at all. Apparently patrol officers cannot do
much to prevent crime, and detectives cannot do much to solve it.
The much publicized Kansas City Patrol Experiment revealed that,
whether the amount of preventive patrol was doubled, left the same,
or eliminated entirely, there was no measurable effect on crime
rates, on citizens' fear of crime, or even on citizens' satisfaction with
the police. 0 And recent studies emphasizing very low arrest rates in
cases in which victims cannot name particular suspects lead Silberman to conclude: "To exaggerate just a bit, the police can solve a
crime if someone tells them who committed it; if no one tells them,
they do not know what to do." 4 '
Morris's and Hawkins's statement that the failure of the death
penalty as a deterrent is "as well established as any other proposition in social science" may remain true in 1979, but the intervening
years have taught us how very little it says. Only one proposition
seems reasonably well established in social science-that we do not
know how well any social institution works. Although Silberman
persuasively criticizes Isaac Ehrlich's attempted empirical demonstration of the deterrent effect of capital punishment, 2 the hopeless
morass of both bad social science and good leads him to agnosticism:
"

SILBERMAN

at 201.

10Id. at 215-16.
1' Id. at 204.
What, then, should be done to improve police performance? Resisting that obvious
answer-"Why bother? It won't work"-Silberman joints Morris and Hawkins in adv'ocating a better breed of officer: "The police . . . must change their conception of their role
from that of a law enforcement agency, dedicated to catching robbers, to that of a public
service agency, devoted to close relationships with, and assistance to, the people and communities being policed." Id. at 243. In this connection, "neighborhood team policing," involving administrative decentralization and sometimes a greater use of foot patrol, seems a
"promising innovation"; yet Silberman recognizes that the empirical evaluations of this
technique so far have been "disappointing," indicating only that this form of policing is no
worse than other police practices in terms of controlling crime and improving policecommunity relations. Id. at 248-49.
42 Id. at 193.
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[S]cholars have written impressive-looking papers on the subject, filled with mathematical equations unintelligible to anyone save mathemeticians and econometricians. Some purport
to prove that the death penalty does deter murder more effectively than existing penalties; others, that it does not. The
National Research Council's Panel on Research on Deterrent
and Incapacitative Effects took a long and searching look at
these papers. After analyzing each scholar's assumptions and
methodology, the panel concluded that the results "provide no
useful evidence" on which a conclusion can be drawn. Indeed,
the panel pronounced itself "skeptical that the death penalty
. . .can ever be subjected to the kind of statistical analyses"
3
needed to draw conclusions with confidence.1
The field of corrections may well supply as much ammunition
for a modern Burkean triumph as any other area of governmental
activity. Silberman reports that the trend toward deinstitutionalization that led Morris and Hawkins to predict the rapid demise of the megaprison has since been reversed dramatically4 4 and
that the term "community-based" as applied to corrections has
become "a 'buzz word' for 'urban.'-"5 As to the group therapy and
other treatment programs of which Morris and Hawkins spoke so
hopefully, Silberman reports:
The last ten years have seen a flood of scholarly literature
documenting the failure of one approach after another. "With
few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have
been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism," the criminologist Robert Martinson wrote in 1974, summing up the conclusion he and two colleagues had reached after
evaluating some 231 research studies. Whether incarcerated or
placed on probation, whether given psychotherapy, group
counseling, job training, or no assistance at all, the proportion
of offenders who return to crime seems to be about the
same-roughly one in three.4
Even if rehabilitation now seems a will-o'-the-wisp, and even
Id. at 192-93 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 373-75.
'5 Id. at 330 n*.
" Id.
at 373 (footnote omitted). Even the simplest reforms in correctional administration
are apparently likely to backfire. Judicial orders designed to reduce inhuman overcrowding
in state prisons cause more offenders to be sent to local jails where conditions are worse. Id.
at 375. And rulings that prevent correctional authorities from simply clapping troublemakers
into the "hole" cause their victims to ask to be sent there for protection. Id. at 416-17.
'3
"
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if, as Silberman also indicates, we cannot determine the extent to
which different levels of imprisonment deter crime, 4 one might suppose that the incapacitative function of correctional institutions
could withstand today's powerful skepticism. What could be more
obvious than that keeping some criminals off the streets for a time
does serve a social function? Yet, as Silberman reports, modern
social science challenges even this viewpoint: "If the supply of criminals is reduced through incapacitation while the number of criminal opportunities remains the same, economic theory tells us that
the return from crime should increase, thereby attracting new people into the criminal labor market."48
B.

Silberman's Symbolic Efforts to Avoid Status Quo-ism

When Silberman simply cannot stand it anymore-when he
allows his latent belief in mankind's ability to solve its problems to
rise to the surface-he probably loses credibility with a large number of his most knowledgeable readers. For Silberman yields less
than most-at least than most criminal justice academics-to the
gloomy dysphoria of 1979. Every so often, he casts about for something hopeful and describes a program that somehow has captured
his faith. The probable reaction of a large portion of his audience
can be anticipated: Sure, the correctional institution at Vienna,
Illinois, sounds like a well-run prison;49 but the administration there
is allowed to select its population of prisoners from other institutions in the state. 0 Plainly, we cannot know whether this prison's
seemingly humane ambiance is the product of what it does, of the
special group of prisoners whom it houses, or of a combination of
both circumstances that could not be duplicated elsewhere. Why,
then, has Silberman ignored the lesson that his book has taught us
repeatedly? Things that seem appealing on the surface usually turn
to -ashes once we touch them. And yes, it's very nice that the residents of a juvenile group home in the Bronx seem inspired by their
housemother. 5' But,. good heavens, let's not put too much faith in
that; we won't know anything about the results until we can
measure them. When virtually none of the programs that Silberman
finds hopeful have been subjected to the kind of empirical testing
that he uses to devastate past efforts, his advocacy of reform seems
11Id. at

196.

4IId.

41Id. at 417-23.

5Id. at 421.
5,

Id. at 327.
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pale-more the product of existential commitment than of hardheaded good sense.
C.

Charles in Bargainland-An Extended Look at Silberman's
Least Successful Chapter

Silberman's chapter on the criminal courts, "Perry Mason in
Wonderland," probably holds the greatest interest for lawyers, and
it supplies a vehicle for analyzing in greater detail the uneasy balance between realism and idealism that Silberman strives to maintain. In this chapter at least, Silberman reveals that what passes for
moderation in 1979 can be as silly as the unabashed optimism of the
past, and he offers some "conventional learning" that one may hope
will, before too very long, go the way of Morris's and Hawkins's most
naive, flamboyant, and empirically unverifiable ukase.
1. The Central Thesis-That the Courts Do Justice. Silberman
tells us that the criminal courts have taken a "bum rap" and that
their principal problem is one of cosmetics:
When one examines what actually happens . . . what is
remarkable is not how badly, but how well, most criminal
courts work. Inefficient and unjust as they appear to be, criminal courts generally do an effective job of separating the innocent from the guilty; most of those who should be convicted are
convicted, and most of those who should be punished are punished. ....
This is not to suggest that we live in the best of all possible
worlds; far from it. It is to argue that what is wrong with the
judicial process is less the results that it produces than the
means by which it produces them. As the old maxim has it, the
appearance of justice is as important as justice itself. Most
criminal courts do do justice; almost none of them appears to
do justice. ...
Most criminal courts undermine respect for law-not by
their results, but by the shabby, haphazard way in which they
are run. . ..
[T]he whole atmosphere makes it difficult for
anyone-defendants, judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys,
victims, and witnesses alike-to avoid developing a protective
veneer of cynicism and boredom.
Indeed, it is impossible to spend time in criminal court
without being appalled by the churlishness of the physical and
social environment; the peeling paint and scuffed linoleum
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floors, the noise and movement, the general surliness and lack
of decorum. . . Officials who may be models of civility, sensitivity, and concern in their private lives display a public face
of callousness and indifference ....
Those who [are] affected by the decisions . . . take it for
granted that nothing [will] be explained to them, and that
. . . judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and clerks [will]
fail to say "please" or "thank you" or otherwise observe the
52
most elementary rules of civilized human discourse.
Before evaluating this thesis, some remarks about the appropriate framework for evaluation seem in order. If the appropriate question is whether the criminal courts achieve rough justice in most
cases, the answer, as Silberman suggests, may very well be yes. But
when that question becomes debatable, as it has in our own criminal
justice system, it seems probable that the criminal courts have
failed badly in their mission. After all, rough justice is not so very
difficult to achieve; almost anyone can do it in only five minutes a
day.
Imagine, if you will, a system of criminal procedure that is
about as repugnant as any-one in which some designated bureaucrat, even a police officer, is empowered to decide whom to imprison
for criminal activity and for how long. This official is restricted by
no sentencing limitations, he need observe no rules of evidence, and
he need conduct no more elaborate a hearing on guilt or punishment
than he happens to find useful for the purpose. In practice, the
official with these unthinkable powers would probably turn out to
be about as decent a person as the rest of us, and most of the people
brought before him would probably turn out to be guilty. We would
probably find that in most cases the official would take his task
fairly seriously, that he would send only a small number of innocent
people to prison, that he would not act vindictively in determining
the length of imprisonment very often, and that he would, indeed,
achieve rough justice in most cases. In that sense, all of the additions to our own system of procedure-the law, the lawyers, the trial
judges, the juries, the officials who conduct presentence investigations, the appellate courts, and all the rest-exist for the exceptional case. Our elaborate adjudicative machinery was created because we hope (or used to) for something better than "rough jus52

Id. at 255-57 (emphasis in original).
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tice." We do care (or we should) about the one case in fifty or one
hundred in which the defendant may be innocent, and we believe
(or we should) that it is worth examining all fifty or one hundred of
those cases if necessary in an effort to find this one. Moreover,
although we recognize that we have very little knowledge of what
constitutes a just sentence, we think it important to do the best that
we can. With years of human liberty at stake, sentencing should at
least be the product of carefully focused consideration-something
more than a ballpark guess. And measured in terms of these objectives-foolish as they apparently seem to many of the lawyers who
work in our criminal courts and to many of the social scientists who
study them-there is a great deal more wrong with the courts than
that the paint is peeling and that lawyers and judges do not say
"please" and "thank you" often enough.
Silberman's view that the courts "do do justice" rests primarily
on an analysis of their overall output-the same sort of analysis that
might "justify" the work of our dictatorial bureaucrat. Silberman
tells us that the courts convict and punish many more people than
their conservative critics think they do. Indeed, they are no more
lenient than the criminal courts of the 1920s (although it is not
entirely clear what comfort a conservative critic is supposed to derive from the fact that our courts are no "worse" than the corrupt,
thoroughly politicized criminal courts of the Roaring Twenties,53 a
period when for a variety of reasons the crime rate apparently increased substantially"). Moreover, the exclusionary rule does not
lead to many lost convictions except in cases of victimless crime
(again a fact that may not offer much comfort to people who favor
the enforcement of narcotics laws). Finally, when officials do "wash
out" a case or reduce a very serious charge to a minor one in exchange for a plea of guilty, they usually have a good reason.
As Silberman explains this last point, "By and large, prosecutors distinguish between 'real crimes'-crimes committed by strangers-and 'junk (or garbage) cases,' i.e., those which grow out of a
dispute between people who know one another."5 5 Of course one can
agree that "stranger crime" is usually more threatening than crime
that grows out of "anger between two or more people who know each
other,""6 but does it truly follow that nonstranger crime is the
See Alschuler, Plea Bargainingand Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 24-26, 26 & n.139
(1979).
" See SmBmm
at 28-30.
m4Id. at 265.
1,Id. (quoting VERA INswmTu op JUsTcE, FELONY ARRETS: THEM PROSECUTION AND DisPOSION IN NEw YoRK Crry's CoURS xv (1977)).
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"junk" that criminal court bureaucrats think it is? Silberman says:
For the most part, the low priority attached to priorrelationship crimes is a realistic response to the nature of the
offense and the frequency of reconciliation. But the downgrading may also reflect strong and unconscious bias of gender or
race-a tendency to treat crimes lightly if they involve blacks
assaulting other blacks, or husbands beating wives.57
Indeed it may; from the perspective of those who administer our
criminal courts, the junkiest case of all may be the "domestic disturbance." Percy Foreman illustrated this fact when he described a
policy that he had established as a prosecutor in Houston a long
time ago:
Like most prosecutors, I thought I was the law, and I inaugurated a bad policy. When a wife complained that her husband
had beaten her, I would not file an assault charge until she had
appeared at the District Attorney's office on three separate
occasions. The "law" that I established is still the law- forty
years later. It has resulted in two or three murders that I know
58
of.
As Silberman observes, it is not only "victimless" crime and
"prior relationship" crime that criminal court officials regard as
garbage: "In New York City, nighttime commercial. burglaries are
almost routinely reduced to misdemeanors; since stores, offices, and
warehouses normally are not occupied at night, prosecutors, judges,
and even policemen view such offenses as nuisance crimes. Residential burglaries, on the other hand, are considered 'real' crimes." 5
Again, the distinction between commercial and residential burglaries seems sound, but how far should it be pressed? When I undertook an investigation of plea bargaining more than a decade ago, I
was far from favorably disposed to the practice; but leaning a bit
toward Silberman's liberal side, I was prepared to dismiss the claim
that plea bargaining resulted in unwarranted leniency. One of the
first cases that I observed in a Cook County courtroom caused me
to reassess this viewpoint, and I soon discovered that this case was
not exceptional. A burglar had been caught red-handed as he
emerged from a store at night with about four hundred dollars that
he had taken. Despite the fact that he had a long record of similar
s SIIBERMAN at 268.

Interview with Percy Foreman, private defense attorney, in Houston (Feb. 21, 1968).
SBERmAN
I
at 269.
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crimes, he was-without a blink or a sideways glance-permitted to
plead guilty to a misdemeanor and was sentenced to a thirty-day
term. This sentence seemed to reflect the kind of sanction that I had
previously associated with victimless offenses like prostitution; a
prostitute, I had been told, could expect to serve a short jail sentence every now and then as a cost of doing business. I was surprised to find, however, that this was also society's response to the
professional predator. It seemed to me time for this professional
burglar to learn what the term felony meant. Was I being hopelessly
naive? Although the chimes of cognitive dissonance were ringing in
my ears, I could not talk myself out of my initial reaction. The result
of the case did not correspond to my sense of "rough justice," and I
suspect that few other Americans who were not enmeshed in the
routine of the criminal courts would have regarded it as "rough
justice" either. As I quickly learned, to the people who run our
criminal courts almost every case seems to be trash; a criminal must
be very, very bad to capture their serious attention. In short, the
"protective veneer of cynicism and boredom" that Silberman discovered is not a veneer; it affects the substance of justice, not merely
the style.
Prior-relationship cases are viewed lightly for two reasons, Silberman explains: first, because they seem relatively unimportant
and, second, because the victim and the alleged victimizer frequently become reconciled so that the victim refuses to cooperate
in the prosecution." Even in cases of "stranger" crime, moreover,
victims sometimes refuse to do their part. Silberman therefore tells
us, "No single factor has so large an impact on what happens to
felons after-they have been arrested: 'complainant noncooperation'
accounted for more than two-thirds of the dismissals of 'victim
felonies' in New York, and well over half in Washington, D.C."'"
Again, prosecutors seem to have good reasons for their actions.
Today's social science is as changeable as the New England
weather, however; if you don't like what it's doing now, just wait a
minute. In this instance, Silberman reported findings by a research
institute that later conducted a study calling those findings into
question. In the more recent study, the victims were approached
directly to learn the reasons for their reticence; the overwhelming
majority were quite surprised to learn that they had been uncooperative. 2

0 Id.
"
62

Id.

F.

at 266.
CANNAVALE

& W.

FALCON, WrrNESS COOPERATMN

75-84 (1976). Although 202 of the

215 witnesses labeled "noncooperative" by prosecutors gave responses that were inconsistent
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Even when "complainant noncooperation" is real, moreover,
the criminal courts themselves may often be to blame. As Silberman
recognizes,
[v]ictims are frustrated and angered when they have to repeat
their story three, four, or even five times as their case is passed
from one assistant district attorney to another. And witnesses
understandably lose interest when they spend a whole day in
court, waiting for the case to be called, only to find that the
judge has rescheduled it to suit an attorney's convenience."
Once again, the sloppy style of American criminal justice ultimately
seems to affect its substance.
2. Judicial Sentencing Practices. Silberman's criticisms of
"presumptive sentencing" proposals and his suggestions of what
should be done to improve judicial sentencing are not very far from
my own,"' but I am far from persuaded by his claim that the underlying problem of judicial sentencing disparity has been seriously
exaggerated. On this issue, at least, Silberman bucks the current
tide of "informed opinion." He maintains that "[w]ithin any single
court system, the overwhelming majority of sentences-on the order
of 85 percent-can be predicted if one knows the nature of the
offense and of the offender's prior record."6 5
The excellent study upon which Silberman relied does not
really go so far. What the study attempted to predict in cases of
imprisonment was not an exact sentence but rather a range of sentences; moreover, the authors "counted" a sentence as within the
range if it fell outside this range by no more than one year.66 To hit
the target most of the time is not too difficult when the target is big
enough, but the difference between even a one-year sentence and
a three-year sentence can be substantial, from the viewpoint of a
defendant. Following this study, moreover, the predictive devices
with this designation, id. at 76, it was of course possible that some of these witnesses had
forgotten the facts or were attempting to "save face" with the interviewers. Nevertheless, the
study reported that "in cases where the witnesses knew the defendants, prosecutors were
observed labeling witnesses as noncooperative not on the basis of observed noncooperation
. . .but in anticipation of it" and that "[s]ome prosecutors . . .acknowledged overusing
the noncooperator label because such a designation reduced the probability of a challenge
from the supervising attorney who reviewed case-screening decisions." Id. at 87, 88.
SLBERmAN at 277.
6 Compare id. at 292-96, 298-99 with Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial

Power: A Critique of Recent Proposalsfor "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U.
PA. L. Rav. 550 (1978).
65 SIIBEAN at 254-55.
" L. WILIKNS, J. KRass, D. Go'rrFRESON, J. CALPN & A. GEmAN, SENTENCING GUIDELINEs: STRUCTURING JuDIciAL DIsCRETION: FINAL REPORT OF THE FEAsmuTY STuDy 80-82 (1976).
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that it employed were converted into "sentencing guidelines" for
judges in several jurisdictions. Judges are currently using these
guidelines to determine the "normal" range of sentences in their
courts for each case that comes before them. The judges are generally enthusiastic about the project and believe that it has enabled
them to reduce prior disparity in their sentencing practices. But
more than twenty-five percent of the sentences that the judges impose are "outside the guidelines," 7 a larger number, apparently,
than before the disparity-reducing guidelines were implemented.
The most plausible explanation for this troublesome fact is simply
that the initial eighty-five percent success rate was, alas, somewhat
aberrational.
To the extent that most criminal sentences can be predicted on
the basis of the characteristics of the offense and the offender, Silberman gives us the reason:
Critics of sentencing policy . . . fail to make the critical distinction between disparities in the sentences judges give and
the sentences defendants receive. Every court has its hanging
judges and its soft touches. . . .But the same kind of discretion that enables individual judges to act capriciously makes
it possible for prosecutors and defense attorneys to limit those
judges' impact. What happens, quite simply, is that in large
court systems hanging judges impose far fewer sentences than
do judges who follow court norms ...
The Detroit Recorder's Court. . . provides a case in point.
At the time a member of my research staff visited the court,
one judge was notorious for the harsh sentences she imposed-"some of her sentences make us shudder," a senior
prosecutor confessed. . . . [I]t was the rare felony defendant
who entered a guilty plea in her court; in 1972, the judge received only sixty-three pleas in felony cases. (By comparison,
a colleague, whom prosecutors and defense lawyers considered
a "capable and conscientious quality judge," received 1,567
guilty pleas in the same period.) With almost every defendant
demanding a jury trial, the judge always had a huge backlog
of cases waiting to be tried. Periodically, therefore, cases were
removed from her docket and assigned to other judges; this, in
turn, gave lawyers a strong incentive to delay their
cases-often with the prosecutor's cooperation-in the hope of
Interview with Arthur M. Gelman, Associate Director of the Sentencing Guidelines
Project, in Boulder, Colorado (July 18, 1979).
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getting a reprieve. All told, the tough sentencer disposed of
only 152 cases in 1972, compared to 2,176 dispositions for the
"quality judge" referred to above, and an average of 800 dispositions for the eleven other judges on the court."'
Apparently, then, Detroit's most lenient judge has about fifteen
times more power to resolve criminal cases than does that city's
"toughest" jurist. To the extent that the disparity in "the sentences
judges give" does not lead to a disparity in "the sentences that
defendants receive," it leads to a disparity in the power of judges-a
disparity that no view of democratic theory can justify. The seemingly severe judge was presumably elected by as many voters as her
more lenient counterpart, yet she has been largely dis-elected by the
criminal court bureaucracy. Surely the Gresham's Law of this bureaucracy ("lenient judges drive out severe judges") gives the
courts' conservative critics a legitimate grievance. The tendency of
the courts to reduce themselves to the lowest common denominator
is no virtue, and rather than defend judge shopping as "one of the
most important checks on arbitrariness in large criminal courts," as
Silberman later does,69 one ought to condemn it as the discriminatory and wasteful practice that it is.07
Silberman describes the most lenient judges-those who
"move" the cases-as following "court norms," and the more severe
judges-those who are largely ousted from office-as acting
"capriciously"; yet one surely cannot assume without further examination that the sentences imposed by the lenient judges are more
appropriate than the sentences imposed by the severe judges. The
"soft" judges of course will be the favorites of the criminal court
bureaucracy; the jovial "quality judges" who move cases rapidly
make life a lot easier for everyone. In the absence of any information
about the sentences imposed by any judge, however, my personal
sympathies lie hesitantly with the judge whom Silberman seems to
deprecate. At least she is willing to pay a heavy price-ostracism
and disparagement by co-workers, a large backlog of cases, and
probably the loss of any prospect of judicial advancement 7 -for
adhering to her own concept of justice.
If one cannot simply cheer the "soft" judges and boo the "hard"

"SmBERmAN at 288-89.
" Id. at 345.
70 See Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179,
1235-37 (1975); Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutorsand TrialJudges, 50 TEx.
L. Rav. 629, 693-94 (1972).
71See note 75 infra.
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judges-if one must remain somewhat more neutral in the absence
of any relevant information-should one nevertheless take comfort
in the fact that the "soft" judges impose substantially more
sentences? This disparity in judicial power does reduce disparity in
"the sentences defendants receive." Yet why should we be concerned only about disparities in "the sentences defendants receive"
and not about "disparities in the sentences judges give"?
To most of us, the statement that defendants are sentenced
twice as severely in the courtroom of Judge A than in the courtroom
of Judge B describes a serious injustice. Silberman, however, seems
to believe that, from a social science perspective, this criticism is
simplistic and involves a methodological fallacy; we overlook the
fact that Judge B, the lenient judge, imposes fifteen times more
sentences than Judge A. Surely we are entitled to respond simply,
"Huh?"
Of course, if we knew that Judge B's sentences were more appropriate than Judge A's, we could take comfort in the fact that
Judge B had more power. Even then, however, our initial perception
of a serious injustice would be accurate. The accident of which judge
a defendant drew would be likely to make a tremendous difference
in his sentence; this disparity in "the sentences judges give" should
indeed concern us even if only 152 defendants each year draw the
judge who is "wrong." In the absence of any information concerning
the appropriateness of the sentences imposed by either judge, moreover, the number of cases that each judge resolves seems meaningless.
Or perhaps not quite meaningless. From the perspective of
some criminal defendants-those very few defendants whose lawyers are not good enough at criminal-court game playing to lead
them from the clutches of the more severe judges--the practices
that Silberman describes may make the problem of sentencing dis2
parity worse. In his concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia,1
Justice Stewart concluded that the death penalty, as it was then
administered, was "so wantonly and so freakishly imposed"" as to
be unconstitutional. "These death sentences are cruel and unusual," he said, "in the same way that being struck by lightning is
cruel and unusual."'" Much the same thing could be said of the
sentences imposed by the ostracized "hanging judge" in Detroit: the
defendants who receive her sentences can feel especially victimized
72408 U.S. 238 (1972).
3 Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
1, Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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because their bad luck is so rare. Like a good social scientist, however, Silberman "measures" justice by looking to a collectivist
"bottom line"-the sentences that defendants receive.
Silberman continues:
In good measure, the amount of sentencing disparity in
any court is a function of the caseload pressure under which
judges operate; the greater the pressure on judges to "move"
cases rapidly, the less opportunity they have to indulge their
personal preferences and biases. "We are slaves to the system,"
the trial judge to whom Willard Gaylin gives the pseudonym
"Judge Garfield" declares. "While I have the appearance of
great discretion, I don't have the reality of it. I work under the
constant awareness of the burden of cases in this court which
demand resolution."
As it happens, I spent time in the court presided over by
"Judge Garfield"; knowing his background and views, it was
easy to recognize the man behind the pseudonym Gaylin used.
The judge had forty-seven cases on his docket on a representative day in which I sat next to him on the bench; he had disposed of thirty-one of them by the time the day ended. Judges
can "move" cases that rapidly, Garfield explained, only if they
have "realistic orientation as to what a case is worth," which
5
is to say, only if they conform to the norms of the court.1
This, apparently, is how the courts "do do justice"-at a rate of
thirty-one cases a day. Judges concede that, because of the pressure
to "move" cases, they do not have "the reality of discretion." They
cannot indulge their personal biases-which is to say that they cannot impose the sentences that they themselves think warranted.
The dominant consideration must always be clearing the docket.
One wonders of Silberman: Why isn't this man screaming? Why
does he tell us only that the problem of sentencing disparity has
been greatly exaggerated?
3.

ProsecutorialPlea Bargaining. The movement toward

sentencing reform is apparently the only lively reform movement in
15SnamL

at 289 (footnotes omitted). Silberman adds in a footnote:
Judges in Garfield's court have a strong incentive to conform to court norms. The chief
judge sends every judge a weekly "report card," listing the number of cases on each
judge's calendar for the preceding week, the number of dispositions, and each judge's
"batting average," i.e., the percentage of cases disposed of during the week. The message
is abundantly clear: judges who want to be reappointed or promoted to a higher court
had better dispose of cases quickly . . ..
Id. at 289 n.*.
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the area of criminal justice today,'7 and this movement itself may
reflect our weariness in the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate, postMartinson" era." It represents a clear-cut retreat from the excessive
rehabilitative ambitions of our recent past. As I have argued elsewhere, however, there is hardly any objection to the sentencing
discretion of judges and parole boards that does not apply in full
measure to the sentencing discretion that prosecutors and defense
attorneys exercise in plea bargaining. In addition, a number of
forceful objections to the discretion exercised in plea bargaining
have little or no application to judicial sentencing discretion and
parole.79 Proposals to prohibit plea bargaining certainly have not
captured the fancy of criminal justice scholars in the same manner
as proposals for "presumptive" or "determinate" sentencing. To the
contrary, many of these scholars insist that plea bargaining is both
inevitable and desirable."
Some of the reasons for the current approbation of plea bargaining in legal and social science circles are clear. Prohibiting plea
bargaining would represent a very significant effort to change the
ways in which our criminal courts operate, and lawyers who have
mastered the old ways (and who of course have little difficulty persuading themselves that they "do do justice" in their own cases) are
reluctant to set forth on a new course. The social scientists, moreover, have become skeptical of any major reform. They have decided
that major reform hardly ever works, that it may backfire, and that
it may have unforeseeable consequences.' Perhaps more importantly, plea bargaining, unlike the discretion of parole boards and
sentencing judges, has never reflected our excessive aspirations. In7,That is, if one does not count the Supreme Court's retreat from Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961), Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and other criminal procedure
rulings of the 1960s as a current reform movement.
7 See text at note 46 supra.
71See Alschuler, supra note 64, at 557-58.
7"Id. at 564.
" See, e.g., M. HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAING 157-62 (1978); Church, In Defense of "Bargain Justice," 13 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 509, 510-11 (1979).
91 A prohibition of plea bargaining might indeed have collateral consequences, as the
experience of Alaska, which has implemented a plea bargaining prohibition with notable
success, seems to indicate. Justice Robert C. Erwin of the Alaska Supreme Court explained:
A no-plea-bargaining policy forces the police to investigate their cases more thoroughly.
It forces prosecutors to screen their cases more rigorously and to prepare them more
carefully. It forces the courts to face the problem of the lazy judge who comes to court
late and leaves early, to search out a good presiding judge, and to adopt a sensible
calendaring system. All of these things have in fact happened here.
Interview with the Honorable Robert C. Erwin, Associate Justice of the Alaska Supreme
Court, in Anchorage (June 14, 1976).
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stead, it has been a forthright manifestation of our cynicism. Few
institutions could be more congenial to the times than one that
says: "Our elaborate adjudicative machinery is a waste. Very few
of the issues that it is designed to resolve are worth our serious
attention. We can probably achieve similar results-or at least do
'rough justice'-without the bother. So why don't we just split the
difference?"
On this issue, Silberman adheres to the conventional academic
wisdom. He says, "It is not true that plea bargaining distorts the
judicial process. Contrary to popular impression, plea bargaining is
not a recent innovation, nor is it the product of heavy caseloads
...
82 Silberman is correct that plea bargaining does not represent a recent "fall from grace," ' but a more important point-one
that I have developed at length in a recent article" 4-is that the
Anglo-American legal system managed to survive without plea bargaining for about seven-eighths of its history. Our historical experience, like the current experience of most other nations of the
world, offers little comfort to the lawyers and social scientists who
join Silberman in the view that plea bargaining is inevitable, an
unavoidable by-product of bureaucratic interaction in any criminal
justice system.
To many social scientists it seems that the "inevitable bureaucratic interaction hypothesis" can be advanced by debunking the
"caseload myth." Silberman tells us:
If trials were the norm and plea bargaining simply a device
by which big-city courts dispose of their heavy caseloads, one
would expect to find relatively little plea bargaining in smaller
cities and rural areas, where caseloads are light. But the overwhelming majority of criminal cases are disposed of by negotiated pleas in every part of the United States, rural as well as
urban, small cities as well as large. 5
In examining the extent to which caseload pressures lead to
plea bargaining, however, the relevant independent variable is neither the size of various jurisdictions nor even the overall size of their
caseloads. The relevant variable is the ratio in each jurisdiction
between caseload and resources-the number of hours or minutes
that prosecutors and other officials have to spend on each case.

"

SILBERmAN at 255 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 279.
Alschuler, supra note 53.

SnBERmAN at 278.
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Because this ratio can be as unfavorable in small-city and rural
jurisdictions as in large cities, Silberman's analysis sheds very little
light on the issue that he addresses. Outside the large cities, moreover,'prosecutors commonly are employed on a part-time basis.
They regularly devote a large share of their time to private law
practice, and their salaries as prosecutors do not vary with the
amount of time they devote to their public duties. As a result, every
hour that these prosecutors take from private practice involves a
financial sacrifice, and they may experience as much pressure to
"move" criminal cases as their full-time, large-city counterparts.86
In both large jurisdictions and small, the bargaining process seems
laden with conflicts of interest that can easily lead lawyers to consider more than the merits of criminal cases in deciding how best
to "get rid of them." Nevertheless, I agree with Silberman's view
that caseload pressure probably is not the primary reason for the
current dominance of plea negotiation. The primary reason instead
is probably that criminal court lawyers and judges, like the rest of
us, are lazy."7 As Malcolm Feeley has observed, there will always be
too many cases in the sense that prosecutors and defense attorneys
would rather be somewhere else. 8
Silberman, however, does not view laziness as a significant reason why prosecutors bargain. "For the most part," he says,
"prosecutors drop felony charges or reduce them to a misdemeanor
because they doubt the defendant's guilt, because they lack the
evidence needed to prove his guilt, or because they feel . . . the
defendant not sufficiently culpable to warrant the stigma and punishment that a felony conviction would bring."8 When a prosecutor
doubts a defendant's guilt or lacks the evidence to prove it, he
certainly has a good reason for dismissing the prosecution, but it is
a very different question whether he should reduce the charge
against the defendant in exchange for a plea of guilty. As I have
written elsewhere, "the practice of bargaining hardest when the case
is weakest leads to grossly disparate treatment for identical offenders-assuming for the moment that they are offenders. ...
[Moreover,] the greatest pressures to plead guilty are brought to
, Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CH. L. REv. 50, 60 n.31
(1968).
V See Alschuler, supra note 53, at 34 (statement of Judge Arthur L. Alarcon).
u M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 272 (1979).
1, SLBFaMAN at 265.
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bear on defendants who may be innocent."9 When Silberman
writes, "In general, prosecutors care less about winning than about
not losing; to lose any significant number of cases weakens their
sense of self and undermines their credibility in the courtroom and
in the larger community,"9 he describes one way in which the personal interests of prosecutors are likely to differ from the public
interests that they have been hired to serve. When a prosecutor's
evidence seems weak, the "safest" course is usually to offer the
defendant whatever concessions seem necessary to ensure that he
will "not lose." This practice subordinates sentencing considerations to the-prosecutor's "batting average" and has terrifying impli-,
cations for defendants who probably could not be convicted at
trial.2
Moreover, when a prosecutor concludes that "the defendant
[is] not sufficiently culpable to warrant the stigma and punishment that a felony conviction would bring," it indeed may be appropriate for him to reduce the charge against the defendant to a misdemeanor. It does not follow that the prosecutor should exact a plea
of guilty as the "price" of this charge reduction. Silberman does not
advert to the possibility that the prosecutor could extend the same
equitable consideration to all "insufficiently culpable" defendants,
even those who exercise the right to trial. To say that mercy may
be given is not to say that mercy should be sold.
Whatever the merits of these reasons for prosecutorial bargaining, the weaknesses of prosecutors' cases and their sympathy for
deserving defendants probably cannot explain most of their plea
bargaining decisions. "More than ninety percent of our felony cases
end in bargained pleas," a New York prosecutor told me. "I certainly hope that they are not all weak cases. 9' 3 In view of the relatively small number of felony arrests that lead to felony prosecutions in New York City,9" the prosecutor's hope is probably justified;
the cases that reach the felony court already have been carefully
screened. And unless one accepts the view that the overwhelming
majority of cases in the felony courts are "trash," it seems doubtful
that equitable circumstances go far toward explaining the ninety
0 Alschuler, supra note 86, at 60.
" SiLBERMAN
92

at 272.

See Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practicesin the Federal Courts,

89 HARV. L. Rv.293 (1975).
,3This statement appears in Alschuler, supra note 86, at 58 n.27.
11See VERA INsTrrUTE OF JUSTICE, FELONY ARRESTS: THEiR PROSECUTION AND DIsposrrION
m NEw YORK'S COURTS 15 (1977) ("only 23% of the felony arrests disposed of in the criminal
process reached their disposition in the Supreme Court [the court in which felony charges
are filed]"); Kuh, Plea Copping, 24 BAR BULL. 160 (1966-1967).
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percent figure either. As Silberman observes, "Even when evidence
of guilt is overwhelming and the case involves a 'bad guy' who has
committed a serious crime, prosecutors prefer to settle the case
through a guilty plea to a lesser felony, so long as the lesser charge
carries an appropriate sentence." 5
What, then, is the appropriate sentence to which Silberman
refers? Is it the same sentence that the "bad guy" would have received following a conviction at trial? If so, his bargain is apparently
no bargain; he may well have been defrauded into sacrificing his
right to trial for nothing. And if the sentence is less severe than the
sentence that would have followed a conviction at trial, either this
sentence or the "post trial" sentence seems at least somewhat
inappropriate. Whether the "guilty plea" sentence is inadequate to
achieve fully the purposes for which criminal punishment is imposed or the "post trial" sentence inflicts gratuitous suffering, the
impropriety of determining the defendant's punishment partly on
the basis of his choice of plea (rather than on either the circumstances of his crime or his personal circumstances) seems apparent."
Although Silberman maintains that prosecutors usually have
good reasons for entering plea agreements, he has few kind words
for the motivation and the competence of defense attorneys. Many
public defenders, he says, "see themselves as production workers
whose job is to move cases along the assembly line as rapidly as
possible." 9 ' Private defense attorneys, moreover, are commonly
worse:
The economics of private practice tend to militate against real
concern for any but affluent clients. . . . Most lawyers in private practice try to offset low fees through large volume; successful "wholesalers," as they are called, may handle five to ten
cases a day, for fees ranging anywhere from $50 per case to
$200, $300, or even $500 per case. The only way to handle that
kind of volume is to plead everyone guilty . ...
Many defense lawyers with active practices have not tried
a single case in years. ...
Lawyers of this sort use all their advantages of position,
style, and verbal skill to browbeat clients into pleading guilty.
Since they usually receive a flat fee per case, payable in ad-

"

SLSEAN at 272.

Contra,AMmcAN BAR ASSOCIATION PRoJEcT ON STANDARDS FOR CRMINAL JUSTICE, STAN§ 1.8 (1968).

DARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY
" SILBERMAN at 305.
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vance, rather than billing on an hourly basis, defense lawyers
have a strong incentive to persuade clients to plead guilty
whether they maintain their innocence or not."'
Although Silberman recognizes that "there are many lawyers of
unquestioned integrity and ability," he notes that "even these lawyers concede that the pressure of their caseload sometimes influences their judgment."" Silberman's description of criminal defense
practice is essentially accurate. How it fits in with his earlier assurance, "It is not true that plea bargaining distorts the judicial process,"'' 0 is beyond my comprehension.
"In any case," Silberman informs us, "abolishing plea bargaining is more easily said than done."'' He offers two pieces of empirical evidence to support this thesis. In one Midwestern county, the
chief prosecutor forbade charge bargaining in drug-sale cases. The
prosecutor's prohibition was apparently effective, but sentence bargaining increased. The study that Silberman cited thus demonstrated that, when a prosecutor changes only the form of plea bargaining, plea bargaining in some form is very likely to continue.
Similarly, if one refuses to sell on an international market for pesos
but continues to sell for yen, he may still make sales-perhaps
1
almost as many as before.
In addition, Silberman observes:
Philadelphia's experience provides a case in point. During his
tenure as district attorney (1969-73), Arlen Specter gained national acclaim for having abolished plea bargaining. The reputation was undeserved; all that Specter did was shift its locus.
Instead of bargaining over the charge to which defendants
would plead guilty, prosecutors and defense attorneys under
Specter's regime did their bargaining over whether or not defendants would waive their right to a jury trial and elect a
bench trial instead. Since bench trials can be completed in a
matter of minutes, they serve substantially the same purpose
as guilty pleas; in some jurisdictions a bench trial.. . . is referred to as "a slow plea of guilty." To induce waivers, Specter's ADAs [Assistant District Attorneys] offered defendants
the same kind of implied sentencing concessions they previously provided to induce a guilty plea; a further inducement
" Id. at 303-04.
"

Id. at 304.

' See text at note 82.

SILBEAaN at 279.
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came from the fact that bench trials were conducted by judges
with reputations as soft sentencers, while the tough sentencers
were assigned to jury trials. In short, plea bargaining was abol02
ished in name only.'
Arlen Specter, so far as I am aware, never claimed to have
abolished plea bargaining in Philadelphia, nor did he gain "national
acclaim" for having done so. Specter's claim was that there was
much less plea bargaining in Philadelphia than elsewhere, and this
claim was apparently accurate. To be sure, one reason for Philadelphia's unusually low guilty-plea rate was the sort of "waiver bargaining" that Silberman described. Nevertheless, it is wrong to
argue that because of this practice, "plea bargaining was abolished
in name only." The practice that Silberman described was not bargaining for a plea of guilty; it was bargaining for one form of trial
rather than another. Both practices may of course be offensive;
indeed, I am convinced that they are. Our Constitution guarantees
defendants a right to jury trial, and they should not pay the price
of additional criminal punishment for daring to exercise it. However
offensive "waiver bargaining" in Philadelphia may be, though, it
seems less offensive than plea bargaining in other jurisdictions.
There is at least some difference between pressing a defendant to
select a particular form of trial and pressing him to forego any trial
whatever.
As Silberman notes, bench trials in Philadelphia and elsewhere
are sometimes called "slow pleas of guilty." The term is a misnomer, however, in two respects. First, there is nothing "slow" about
the procedure; it may, in fact, require less time than the process of
negotiating a guilty plea and of making the record that will justify
its acceptance in the courtroom. Second, Philadelphia bench trials
are not usually the "functional equivalent" of pleas of guilty. Philadelphia judges do consider the evidence presented at these trials and
are not reluctant to acquit when this evidence fails to establish guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Although serving some of the same
purposes, bench trials in Philadelphia therefore differ from negotiated settlements elsewhere in several respects. A Philadelphia
bench trial is a public rather than a closed-door proceeding; the
defendant is able to present his side of the story to an impartial
third party (a procedure that may have therapeutic value in itself);
and most importantly, the defendant does not surrender his chance
for an acquittal. Silberman, however, disregards these differences in
112

Id. at 279-80 (footnote omitted).
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his rush to declare, "Ah ha, Arlen Specter, you flex too! We knew
that you were no different from the rest of us! Indeed, in this enlightened age, we know that everybody flexes." ' 3
Of course Silberman favors reform of the criminal courts.
"Formal rules and guidelines" are essential, he tells us,' 4 and
"simple courtesy would go a long way toward encouraging respect
for law."105 Perhaps most importantly, we need "to hold the 'price'
of going to trial to a reasonable level-to keep the difference between the sentences meted out after trial and after a guilty plea
small enough so that choosing a trial remains a viable option." '
Silberman concedes, "My 'solution' is conceptually untidy, acknowledging in practice what constitutional theory denies. The argument for it is wholly pragmatic; if a practice cannot be eliminated, more is to be gained from regulating than from forbidding
it."1o7

Like most of the observers who confidently assert that prohibitions of plea bargaining would be unenforceable, however, Silberman pays no attention to problems of enforcement in advancing his
own proposal for reform. Although he apparently believes that pros1 Following the passage quoted in text at note 102 supra, Silberman notes:
The discrepancy between form and substance [in Philadelphia] was even more profound. For all his strictures against the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, Specter
placed great emphasis on early screening and diversion. ADAs were stationed in police
stations, with a mandate to get the "junk" cases out of the system at the earliest point,
through dismissal, reduction of charges, or diversion.
Id. at 280 n.*. I very much doubt that Arlen Specter issued "strictures against the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion"; to the contrary, Specter seemed to take pride in the very screening devices that Silberman noted. See, e.g., A. SPECTER, THE 1970-1971 REPORT TO THE PEOPLE
OF PHuAELPHiA 265-66 (1972). Moreover, there is a manifest difference between "discretion"
and "plea bargaining"-between a unilateral judgment about whether charges should be filed
and a self-serving trade.
Silberman also reports that "most of the recent proposals for doing away with plea
bargaining were tried [during the 1920s] and found wanting." SILBERMAN at 278. His usually
well-documented book offers no support for this proposition, however, and I know of no
jurisdiction that attempted to do away with plea bargaining in the 1920s. What was tried
following the "discovery" of plea bargaining by the crime commissions of the 1920s was
moderate reform of the sort that lawyers and social scientists commonly advocate today.
Moreover, when the state of New York required prosecutors to set forth in writing their
reasons for entering charge-reduction agreements, this reform was indeed found wanting:
prosecutors supplied the same empty reasons in case after case. See Weintraub & Tough,
Lesser Pleas Considered, 32 J. CraM. L. & CmmImoLoOy 506, 521 (1942).
SSIBERMAN

at 298, 301.

Id. at 298. In addition, public defenders should not be saddled with crushing caseloads
and should receive adequate salaries; they should locate their offices away from the courthouse; and they should avoid symbols of officialdom that their clients are likely to find
offensive, such as state seals on their business cards. Id. at 306-07.
"0 Id. at 284.
107Id.
'
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ecutors and defense attorneys have little regard for the law and
would therefore seek backdoor mechanisms to evade a prohibition
of plea bargaining, he seems to assume that these same lawyers
would meekly comply with a rule that told them, "Don't take more
than ten percent off." Perhaps Silberman has forgotten the situations that, even in his view, prompt prosecutors and defense attorneys to bargain-for example, the case in which the evidence is
weak but in which the prosecutor's "sense of self" makes it important that he "not lose." Would this prosecutor readily limit his offer
to "ten percent off"? Surely the closed-door, "underground" mechanisms that threaten abolition efforts pose similar impediments to
"moderate" reform. Silberman relies on a modern truism that simply is not true: that it is always easier to regulate a practice than to
forbid it.
In fact, the opposite view may sometimes come closer to the
truth. In a system in which trial judges rather than prosecutors
struck bargains with defendants, it might be possible for a trial
judge first to determine the defendant's probable "posttrial" sentence and then to "discount" it.' In a system of prosecutorial bargaining, however, it would be extremely difficult to give content to
Silberman's proposal. At the time that prosecutors and defense attorneys strike their bargains, they can only guess at what Silberman
regards as the appropriate baseline-the "posttrial" sentence.
Moreover, criminal sanctions commonly are not commensurate with
one another. Under Silberman's proposal, could a prosecutor offer
any bargain to a defendant who faced a possible death penalty if
convicted at trial, or would any offer that eliminated this risk be
"excessive"? Could the prosecutor offer to recommend that a defendant who had been unable to secure his pretrial release be sentenced
only to the time that he had already served in jail, or would this
offer, even though it represented only "ten percent off," be coercive
in its assurance of an immediate release from custody? Could the
prosecutor offer to reduce a felony charge to a misdemeanor when
this bargain would not substantially alter the period of the defendant's incarceration, or would the resulting difference in
"stigmatizing labels" make the offer coercive? Could the prosecutor
ever offer a probated sentence to a defendant who would run a risk
of imprisonment if convicted at trial?0 9 Most importantly, should
10 See Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining (pt. 1), 76 COLUM. L. REV.
1059, 1124-28 (1976).
I" If all of these offers of qualitative changes in punishment were prohibited, the effect
would be to outlaw the overwhelming majority of bargains that prosecutors and defense
attorneys currently enter in felony cases.
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we make "exceptions" for all of the situations in which Silberman
seems to believe that substantial charge reductions in exchange for
pleas of guilty are appropriate-the "trash" case in which the victim seems as culpable as the defendant, the "weak" case in which
the prosecutor may not be able to secure a conviction at trial, the
case in which the defendant is "not sufficiently culpable to warrant
the stigma and punishment that a felony conviction would bring,"
and so on? By the time that we finally had resolved these issues, we
would probably have a regulatory scheme so complicated-and so
thoroughly riddled with exceptions-that prosecutors and defense
attorneys usually could rationalize an evasion as no evasion at all.
The enforcement of a clear-cut prohibition might well be easier.
Finally, Silberman offers some jurisprudential criticism of proposals to abolish plea bargaining:
Eliminating plea bargaining would be undesirable even if
it were possible. Proponents of abolition assume that the question to be resolved in a criminal case is always simple and
clear-cut: Is the defendant guilty or not guilty of committing
the crime with which he is charged? If the answer is Not guilty,
the defendant should be freed; if it is Guilty, he should receive
the "proper" punishment for the offense. To convict a defendant of any lesser charge, in this view, or to sentence him to
any lesser punishment, is a perversion of justice.
It is a curious notion of justice to tie it so completely to the
prosecutor's uncontrolled discretionary decision about the
crime with which an offender will be charged. Opponents of
plea bargaining attribute an objectivity to the charging decision that most prosecutors would be loath to claim; as Professor
Arnold Enker has written, the opponents of plea bargaining
seem to assume that there is "an objective truth existing in a
realm of objective historical fact" that can best be ascertained
through a jury trial. But the "truth" of an offense is usually
neither objective nor absolute; it is embodied in the way "the
facts" are interpreted and in the significance attached to them,
as much as in the facts themselves.
In the great majority of criminal cases, "the facts" are not
in dispute. What is at issue-what needs to be adjudicated-is
the significance that should be attached to the facts. Decisions
about the seriousness of the offense and the degree of an offender's culpability involve complex and often highly subjective judgments about such factors as premeditation, intent,
force, credibility, negligence, threat, recklessness, and harm.
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What is being adjudicated is not guilt or innocence, but the
punishment the offender deserves. 10
This passage is a muddle. Certainly the opponents of plea bargaining do not attribute any special objectivity to the prosecutor's
charging decision. They can fairly be accused only of attributing
some objectivity to the decisions of the courts and juries whom they
would entrust with the resolution of criminal cases more often than
at present. Imperfect though these courts and juries undoubtedly
are, they are not beset by the personal conflicts of interest that
influence the judgments of prosecutors and defense attorneys in plea
bargaining. To most opponents of plea bargaining, juries do indeed
seem more objective than the public defenders who "see themselves
as production workers whose job is to move cases along the assembly
line as rapidly as possible,""' than the private defense attorneys
who "have a strong incentive to persuade clients to plead guilty
whether they maintain their innocence or not,""' and than the prosecutors who care about "not losing."1 3 There is no sense in which

the academic opponents of plea bargaining (at least if I am representative of this seemingly small group) would tie their notions of
justice "to the prosecutor's uncontrolled discretionary decision
about the crime with which an offender will be charged." Apart
from the fact that courts and juries can check unwarranted exercises of prosecutorial discretion, prosecutors themselves should
do so. Abolishing plea bargaining certainly does not require that a
prosecutor be "tied" to every charge that he has filed. Whenever
evidence has emerged that makes a prosecutor's initial charge
appear unjustified, he should change it; indeed, he may have a
professional obligation to do so. The only issue is whether he should
make his alteration of the charge contingent upon the defendant's
entry of a plea of guilty.
Moreover, the opponents of plea bargaining do not "assume
that the question to be resolved in a criminal case is always simple
and clear-cut." To the contrary, it is when the issue is not simple
and clear-cut that courts and juries seem most necessary. And yes,
many of the hardest issues are not questions of historic fact; they
are questions of how historic facts should be characterized as a
matter of law (which, contrary to Silberman's suggestion, is not
necessarily the same issue as what punishment the defendant
should receive). Does it follow that these issues of characterization
"

"

SILBERMAN at 280-81.
See text at note 97 supra.

112See text at note 98 supra.
"I See text at note 91 supra.
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are unimportant or that they can best be resolved by "splitting the
difference"? How can "complex and often highly subjective judgments about such factors as premeditation, intent, force, credibility, negligence, threat, recklessness, and harm" best be made?
I have a radical answer to this question, one that will doubtless
seem foreign and bizarre to a number of modern academics and
criminal law practitioners. To begin with, a person who is not committed to one viewpoint or the other should listen to the evidence.
Then this judge or juror should determine as best he can what
happened, and finally he should focus specifically on the ultimate
issue of characterization: What intent did the defendant have?
What force did he use? What harm did he cause? If this view is
incorrect, I do not understand what trials are for. It is surely a
prerequisite of justice in troublesome, contested cases that someone
listen.
. Of course some cases-quite a few-do involve issues of historic
fact. Silberman says, "When the facts are in dispute-when there
is reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime with
which he is charged-a jury trial is the most appropriate means of
adjudication.""' One wonders what Silberman would do to implement this concept of procedural justice, for our current system of
criminal justice does not do so. Prosecutors care about "not losing"
even in cases in which historic facts are in dispute, and they seem
about as likely to compromise these cases as any others. Perhaps an
additional moderate reform is therefore in order: prosecutors should
be told to compromise only issues of characterization, not issues of
historic fact. If the defense witnesses say that the victim shouted,
"I'll kill you," before the defendant drew his knife, and if the state's
witnesses maintain that the victim shouted only, "Hello, old
friend," plea bargaining is inappropriate. If, however, everyone
agrees that the victim's shout was, "Here I come, you rat," the
question whether this threat warranted the defendant in drawing
and using his knife can properly be the subject of a bargain. Plainly,
the distinction that Silberman suggests cannot be made workable
in an operational system of justice. And Silberman cannot have it
both ways.
Silberman frequently speaks of the law as an "educating institution," of the "flow of propaganda" that encourages respect for
law, of the "symbolic" role of trials, and of the "aura of injustice"
currently conveyed by our criminal courts. He maintains that

"' SILBERMAN

at 282.

Review

1979]

1041

"appearances count, especially where justice is concerned. ' 115 Just
as Silberman reports that violent crime has become more expressive
than instrumental in recent years, he apparently views his own
proposals for law reform as more expressive than instrumental as
well. Even in terms of emanations, auras, propaganda messages,
and symbols, however, it would be difficult to imagine a more
appropriate target than today's plea bargaining practices. In the
words of J. Eugene Pincham, "Plea bargaining cheapens the
system. It encourages the defendant to believe that he has sold a
commodity and that he has, in a sense, gotten away with something."' 16 Plea bargaining reinforces the view of offenders who see
the world as a network of processes and connections and who assume
that justice is all a matter of whom you know.
Indeed, Silberman himself seems to make the point:
[Defendants] are disillusioned by the unfairness-apparent or
real-that they experience in court. From a defendant's
perspective, [Jonathan] Casper writes, "outcomes do not
seem to be determined by principles or careful consideration of
persons, but by hustling, conning, manipulating, bargaining,
luck, fortitude, waiting them out, and the like." Indeed, "the
system has no real moral component in the eyes of the defendant." On the contrary, defense lawyers and judges, no less
than prosecutors, policemen, and probation officers, seem to be
operating on a moral level no different from the one on which
17
criminals themselves operate.
It is hard to believe that Silberman is not writing about plea bargaining or that the defective moral lessons that he thinks our criminal courts teach can be corrected by anything short of the prohibition of this practice.
CONCLUSION

Of course my grievance on this issue is less with Silberman than
with the lawyers and social scientists-"the best and the brightest"
in the field of criminal justice-who seem to have led him astray.
And I certainly should not close this review without offering a brief
overall assessment of what is, despite my criticism, the very good
book that prompts it. Charles Silberman is a super journalist; he

"
"'

Id. at 297.
Interview with J. Eugene Pincham, Private Defense Attorney, in Chicago (Dec. 15,

1967).
11tSILBERMAN at 298.
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has done his homework thoroughly; he writes elegantly and has
rendered much difficult material readable; and although I think
that he has gone wrong in the chapter that is the principal focus of
this review, he is, in the main, a thoughtful and sensitive scholar.
Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice is without any doubt the one
book to read on the subject of crime and criminal justice if you are
reading only one.
Nevertheless, and despite the serious defects that a decade's
hindsight may suggest, The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime
Control remains to me a more attractive volume in its approach to
criminal justice reform. In the conclusion of this book, Morris and
Hawkins quoted a passage from a task force report of the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice:
The criminal justice system may be compared to a blind man
far down the side of a mountain. If he wants to reach the top,
he must first move. And it matters little whether his first move
is up or down because any movement with subsequent evaluation will tell him which way is up. A step by step process of
experimenting, evaluating, and modifying must be undertaken. Both innovation and the subsequent evaluation of its
consequences are essential to climbing up." '
This passage is among those that may seem naive ten years later.
An intervening decade of social science research seems to have
taught us only that it is not so easy to tell which way is up after all.
Most moves seem to lead in circles, and more seem to lead downward than toward the heights. Moreover, few of us even hope to
reach the mountaintop any longer; for most of us, it would be
enough simply to get out of the woods.
And it is well that we have the knowledge that the past decade
has provided, discouraging though this knowledge often is. We
should recognize forthrightly the difficulty of social change that
recent social science research has emphasized. Our future reform
efforts may not be accompanied by the great whoops of enthusiasm
that have accompanied reform efforts of the past. Even when we
cannot know what works, however, we can recognize the injustice
around us. And perhaps our guiding principle should not be, as
Silberman suggests, "First, do no harm"-a principle that can be
fulfilled most easily by doing nothing. A more. appropriate first principle may be, "Do not blink injustice." We may need to rekindle the

MORRIS & HAWKINS at 261-62.
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fires of our indignation, for some parts of our criminal justice system
merit this indignation. And although we should always eschew blind
faith, assess the consequences of our actions as best we can, and
strive as best we can to do good rather than harm, in the end it may
be necessary to give some play to our intuition-to our perceptions
of injustice-and to take a chance on change. In that sense, the
central perception of the passage quoted by Morris and Hawkins
seems sound: If one hopes to reach the mountaintop, or even to get
out of the woods, he must first move.

